Showing posts with label finance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label finance. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Democracies and Industrial Policy

Fareed Zakaria had an interesting comment about industrial policy on his show yesterday:
Andrew Liveris, the CEO of Dow Chemical, has been arguing for a national policy aimed at reviving manufacturing. In his book, Make It In America, Liveris argues that not only would a manufacturing policy produce good, long-term jobs, it would upgrade the job skills that are crucial to keeping innovation alive.

"Innovation doesn't just happen in laboratories by researchers," he told me. "It happens on the factory floor. The process of making stuff helps you experiment and produce new products. If everything is made in China, people there will gain the skills, knowledge and experience to innovate. And we will be left behind." He worries that with tablets like the iPad and Kindle being made mostly in Asia, the next generation of these products could well be imagined there.

Companies can't compete with countries, he says.

Take solar energy, an industry largely invented in America, in which the manufacturing has largely moved to China thanks to massive state subsidies. Or consider wind turbines: China's biggest windmill makers have received more than $15.5 billion in credits from state-owned banks.

As a result, despite many concerns about quality, they won their first major foreign orders in the past year.

In theory, I am deeply skeptical of government industrial policy. Government doesn't know how to pick winners and losers, it makes mistakes, the process gets politicized.

And yet, when I look around the world, particularly in Asia, I see governments playing a crucial role. They do make mistakes – their versions of Solyndra – but they seem to view it like venture capitalists.

Their role is to seed many companies, only a few of which will succeed. Once successful, the government helps these companies to compete against big American multinationals.

There used to be a joke about Marxist economists who would say of a deviation from pure Communist economics: "It might work in practice, comrade, but it doesn't work in theory."

That's what industrial policy looks like these days.

The theory doesn't make much sense but it's hard to argue with the results.
I'm more than deeply skeptical about government industrial policy, but I think the key difference between Fareed and me is that I'm mostly skeptical of such policies in a democracy.  China and most of the former Asian tigers aren't democracies; they're authoritarian capitalist economies.  When you've got only marginally accountable leaders, they can indeed act like venture capitalists, because they can make nimble decisions about where to invest.  (The fact that a certain number of those nimble decisions would be considered corrupt by a democracy is almost irrelevant to the leaders of such states.  An authoritarian system exists to perpetuate the power of the leadership and its friends.)

The Chinese government in particular is its own venture capital firm, because the government has no compunctions about being a shareholder in whatever companies it views as interesting.  Tian and Estrin estimate that the Chinese government holds a majority shareholder position in  31% of all Chinese publicly listed companies.  The government is perfectly content to reap a big chunk of the profits from these companies, something that would be unheard of in the US.

If a democracy tries to do the same thing, it is immediately besieged by rent-seekers whom it is not allowed to shoot.  Every decision will be lobbied, questioned, and criticized, with no risk of acquiring unsightly holes in the back of one's head.  This has two effects:  First, it makes all investment decisions incredibly bland, and bland investing tends to have a lousy return.  But more important, it makes every investment decision permanent.  Once the rent-seekers get involved, the machinery becomes impossibly ponderous.

So the real question is, can democracies have a government-funded venture capital system that makes intelligent investment decisions, but is relatively immune to rent seeking?

As I understand it, most venture firms raise capital for their investments as private equity funds.  Large investors form limited partnerships and commit capital for the fund, which is then called down by the fund managers as investments are made in the startups in the portfolio.  This is very different from a typical public LLC, which would just sell stock and raise capital from the sale.  I'm sure there are lots of good reasons to use the private equity model, but it does necessarily tend to keep the amounts of capital bounded, and there is less incentive to scale the investments up, or across more startup companies.


I keep wondering how this would change if there was some kind of GSE that could securitize debt for venture capital firms, giving them a much larger access to cheap capital than they'd have from private equity partners.  If this all sounds a little iffy after September, 2008, you're right--it is.  But you could presumably issue the debt instruments so that you couldn't write credit default swaps against them.  It would then be fairly easy for the government to select sectors to invest in, and direct more or less money to each sector by changing the securitization commitments, without ever getting involved in picking the individual companies.   The government could even buy the bonds themselves if the private sector didn't have an appetite for them.

This is hardly immune to rent-seeking, but at least the lobbying is occurring at the sector level, rather than at the level of individual companies.

I'm sure when I wake up in the morning this will sound like a terrible idea.  Still...

Monday, January 23, 2012

Could This Be Made Into a Business?

Reports of Romney opening up a bit of wiggle room on mortgage modification got me to thinking about why somebody isn't making serious, organized money off of short sales--and helping homeowners at the same time.  The market for this would the set of people who should strategically default, that is, homeowners whose houses are more than 10% underwater but who can still pay their mortgages.  These people haven't defaulted yet for one of the following reasons:
  1. They're emotionally attached to their homes and will do almost anything to avoid moving.
  2. They're afraid of their credit rating taking a hit, thereby preventing them from buying another house.
  3. They think it's morally wrong to default on your debts when you can pay.
So here's my question:  why wouldn't a mortgage originator purchase short sales for these people with the (contractual) understanding that they would immediately sell back the house to the homeowner for a fixed percentage price greater than the short sale price, and give them a 100% mortgage at the prevailing price?

In a little more detail, here's how it would work:
  1. Shorts 'R' Us approaches Joe Blow, the homeowner:  "We understand from the tax rolls in your area that your house is 20% underwater.  We'll broker a short sale with your lender, buy the house ourselves, sell it back to you at a profit to us, and give you a new mortgage.
  2. Joe Blow signs a contract with Short 'R' Us.  Joe Blow can get out of the contract if Shorts 'R' Us can't broker the short sale with the lender.
  3. Shorts 'R' Us goes to the lender offering to buy the property in a short sale, of course disclosing the deal with Joe Blow, as required by RESPA.
  4. Will the lender agree to this?  If it's convinced that the alternative is strategic default, I don't see why not.  They have to mark the mortgage as a loss, but if they carry the foreclosed property, they're writing down the same loss when they auction it off.  Of course, if there are secondary lienholders, things get a lot more complicated.
  5. The short sale goes through.  Shorts 'R' Us buys the house and pays off the lender.
  6. Shorts 'R' Us then immediately sells the house back to the homeowner for 2-3% more than the short sale value, and originates a new loan for the homeowner.
  7. Shorts 'R' Us then sells the loan to the secondary market (or as much of it as is now allowed by Dodd-Frank). 
  8. Lather, rinse, repeat.
What's in it for the original lender?  Well, he doesn't have to deal with the foreclosure, and he's got the crappy loan off of his books.  He does have to recognize the loss, but, duh, is that really an issue at this point?

What's in it for the homeowner?  He's got an almost-sustainable loan, with substantially reduced principal, although at a somewhat higher interest rate.   (More on this in a moment.)  He's got a fairly bad ding to his credit rating, but he probably doesn't care that much because he's got a new mortgage.  As long as he pays as agreed for a couple of years, he'll be fine, even if he trades properties.  Besides, a quarter of the country has the same ding on their credit rating.  Who cares?

Let's now look at Shorts 'R' Us in a bit more detail.  First, they're instantly making their markup on the buy-resell transaction, virtually risk-free.  It's possible that the original mortgage lender will demand that they kick in some commission, which would either reduce their profitability or force them to demand a higher markup.  Note that as the markup increases, you lose some chunk of your addressable market, because the homeowner's going to make the decision to do this based on whether his payments go down or at least stay the same.  It's likely that the new mortgage has a higher interest rate, because it's instantly underwater, although not by much.  What kinds of secondary markets are available may be somewhat limited, and the amount by which they're going to discount the loan is going to be a key variable.  On the other hand, the credit quality of the loans is higher than it looks on paper, because the homeowners have been paying as agreed and they're motivated to stay in the homes, or they wouldn't be doing this.

To sum up:

Credits to Shorts 'R' Us:
  • The markup on the re-sell
Debits:
  • Commission to the original mortgage lender.
  • Discount on the sale of the loan to the secondary market.
What am I missing?  This sounds like a slam-dunk business.  Is there something that makes it illegal?

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Can the Financial System Be Made to Operate in the Public Interest?

Tyler Cowan thinks probably not:
A key lesson to take from all of this is that simply railing against income inequality doesn’t get us very far. We have to find a way to prevent or limit major banks from repeatedly going short on volatility at social expense. No one has figured out how to do that yet.

It remains to be seen whether the new financial regulation bill signed into law this past summer will help. The bill does have positive features. First, it forces banks to put up more of their own capital, and thus shareholders will have more skin in the game, inducing them to curtail their risky investments. Second, it also limits the trading activities of banks, although to a currently undetermined extent (many key decisions were kicked into the hands of future regulators). Third, the new “resolution authority” allows financial regulators to impose selective losses, for instance, to punish bondholders if they wish.

We’ll see if these reforms constrain excess risk-taking in the long run. There are reasons for skepticism. Most of all, the required capital cushions simply aren’t that high, so a big enough bet against unexpected outcomes still will yield more financial upside than downside. Furthermore, high capital reserve requirements insulate bank managers from the pressures of both shareholders and bondholders. That could encourage risk-taking and make the underlying problem worse. Autonomous managers often push for risk-taking rather than constrain it.

What about controlling bank risk-taking directly with tight government oversight? That is not practical. There are more ways for banks to take risks than even knowledgeable regulators can possibly control; it just isn’t that easy to oversee a balance sheet with hundreds of billions of dollars on it, especially when short-term positions are wound down before quarterly inspections. It’s also not clear how well regulators can identify risky assets. Some of the worst excesses of the financial crisis were grounded in mortgage-backed assets—a very traditional function of banks—not exotic derivatives trading strategies. Virtually any asset position can be used to bet long odds, one way or another. It is naive to think that underpaid, undertrained regulators can keep up with financial traders, especially when the latter stand to earn billions by circumventing the intent of regulations while remaining within the letter of the law.

It’s a familiar story, repeated many times in the past. If one recalls the Basel I capital agreements for banks, the view was that we would make banks safer by inducing them to hold a lot of AAA-rated mortgage-backed assets. How well did that work out? So, with no disrespect to the regulators or the sponsors of the recent bill, it is hardly clear that enhanced regulation will solve the basic problem.

For the time being, we need to accept the possibility that the financial sector has learned how to game the American (and UK-based) system of state capitalism. It’s no longer obvious that the system is stable at a macro level, and extreme income inequality at the top has been one result of that imbalance. Income inequality is a symptom, however, rather than a cause of the real problem. The root cause of income inequality, viewed in the most general terms, is extreme human ingenuity, albeit of a perverse kind. That is why it is so hard to control.

Another root cause of growing inequality is that the modern world, by so limiting our downside risk, makes extreme risk-taking all too comfortable and easy. More risk-taking will mean more inequality, sooner or later, because winners always emerge from risk-taking. Yet bankers who take bad risks (provided those risks are legal) simply do not end up with bad outcomes in any absolute sense. They still have millions in the bank, lots of human capital and plenty of social status. We’re not going to bring back torture, trial by ordeal or debtors’ prisons, nor should we. Yet the threat of impoverishment and disgrace no longer looms the way it once did, so we no longer can constrain excess financial risk-taking. It’s too soft and cushy a world.

That’s an underappreciated way to think about our modern, wealthy economy: Smart people have greater reach than ever before, and nothing really can go so wrong for them. As a broad-based portrait of the new world, that sounds pretty good, and usually it is. Just keep in mind that every now and then those smart people will be making—collectively—some pretty big mistakes.

How about a world with no bailouts? Why don’t we simply eliminate the safety net for clueless or unlucky risk-takers so that losses equal gains overall? That’s a good idea in principle, but it is hard to put into practice. Once a financial crisis arrives, politicians will seek to limit the damage, and that means they will bail out major financial institutions. Had we not passed TARP and related policies, the United States probably would have faced unemployment rates of 25 percent of higher, as in the Great Depression. The political consequences would not have been pretty. Bank bailouts may sound quite interventionist, and indeed they are, but in relative terms they probably were the most libertarian policy we had on tap. It meant big one-time expenses, but, for the most part, it kept government out of the real economy (the General Motors bailout aside).
The other important idea from this piece is that Cowan equates rising income inequality solely from the abuses of the financial sector. He argues that, if you remove this, inequality has changed very little for 98% of the US population.

He also cites "threshold earners", people who work only to make a specific amount of money and then devote the rest of their time to pursuits that improve their quality of life, as another factor that's making inequality appear worse than it actually is.

If Cowan is right, we're likely to be subject to financial crisis after financial crisis, until we finally learn how to prevent people from gaming the system. The problem is that the people gaming the system are smarter than the people trying to engineer a solution, so they have a built-in advantage that's likely to last decades until the legal and regulatory frameworks have walled-off all the low-hanging fruit.

The big problem here is that the technology is still accelerating the information flows upon which the financial beast feeds, which means that the crises are likely to be sharper, less anticipated, and closer together.

An important piece, very clear, and ultimately pretty depressing.

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

I'm Not Understanding Something

So, we have the banks sitting on piles and piles of CDOs, because if they sell them, they'll wind up under-capitalized and begin the credit-trap death spiral. But doesn't mark-to-market accounting require them to write down their CDOs' value as soon as anybody sells enough of them to make a market?

Could it be that nobody is selling CDOs? And, if so, doesn't that start to smell a bit of collusion on the banks' part?

Wednesday, October 8, 2008

Radically Moderate Answers to the Debate Questions

It didn't take more than about five minutes into the debate last night before I started having this fantasy about a candidate that would actually answer the questions being posed with something resembling a sophisticated, even wonky, version of the truth. Without any further ado, then, here is the Radically Moderate version of the debate. (I'm not going to rebut McCain and Obama's individual points here--that would simply be too painful.)
QUESTION: With the economy on the downturn and retired and older citizens and workers losing their incomes, what's the fastest, most positive solution to bail these people out of the economic ruin?
The worst thing we could do in this crisis is to to focus on one set of citizens at the expense of the others, so I wouldn't be doing anything specific to favor retired and older citizens.

There is a short-term solution to the current crisis, a medium-term solution, and a long-term solution. All must be implemented properly to get the least bad outcome we can hope for. A recession is a foregone conclusion at this point. The trick is to prevent the recession from becoming severe and to make it as short as possible.

In the short term, we have an erosion of trust and confidence in the institutions that extend credit for the economy. Restoring that trust is time-critical, because every day that passes where lending is impaired is a day where producers of goods and services may run into cash flow difficulties that cause them to lay off workers or even go bankrupt. So the short-term priority is to restore lending practices to some semblance of normality.

The TARP, the Fed accepting commercial paper, coordinated, worldwide interest rate cuts, and targeted injections of liquidity are all necessary. Similarly, relaxing mark-to-market accounting rules and instituting a decimalized update of the uptick rule for short selling are important. But the biggest problem we face in the short term is that public ignorance about the nature of the crisis is fueling panic.

Finance is hard; I don't pretend to understand it well enough to manage this crisis personally. But it is every American's duty to get as educated as he can on the issues. It is essential to understand what parts of the problem are caused by fundamental changes in the economic situation and what parts are being caused by panic. Knowledge is power; when you understand the crisis, you can be worried without panicking. Reductions in panic are what finally stanches the bleeding on the first phase of this crisis.

In the medium term, once we have bought ourselves some breathing room and restored a functioning credit market, we have to fix the immediate cause of the credit crisis, which is the decline in home prices and the disruptions that that has caused in the mortgage market. Here we have to understand that, just as American financiers did stupid things and we still had to rescue some of them for the sake of the public good, American borrowers did stupid things and we're going to have to rescue some of them for the common good.

There are two problems here. First, lots of people are upside-down on their mortgages; the mortgage is worth more than the house. That means that, for the fairly modest cost of taking a hit on one's credit report, it's cheaper to mail in the keys to the lender and default than it is to stay and tough out the payments on a non-productive asset. There should be no moral judgment attached to this. The fundamental problem is that American homeowners are acting rationally by walking away, which further erodes home prices. To solve this problem, we have to prevent this from happening, which means that the mortgage principal has to be reduced to something like 90-95% of the current fair market value of the house. This will entail a huge loss for lenders. For that reason, the government is going to have to subsidize these reductions.

The next problem is that borrowers took out mortgages--sub-prime and otherwise--with ridiculously low teaser interest rates and equally ridiculous escalators once the teaser expired. Blame can be assessed for this both on the lenders, who knew that the borrower was going to get in trouble, and the borrower, who should have known better in the first place. Again, blame gets us nowhere; we have to increase the affordability of the mortgages to prevent homeowners from defaulting. That means that we have to split the difference and reduce the escalators while still providing some return on investment for the lender.

Finally, we get to the long term. The mantra throughout the country is "re-regulate" and some new regulation is clearly in order, as is regulatory reform and restructuring for efficiency. But let's be clear: there is a cost to regulation. Regulation makes lending more expensive. Regulation means that consumer loans and mortgages will be more expensive and harder to come by in the future. All regulations come with unintended consequences. Excessive regulation can prove disastrous.

The temptation to punish Wall Street for their excesses is almost overwhelming. But we're grownups; we have to resist that temptation when that punishment also punishes the ordinary citizen, either directly or indirectly. Instead, we need to look soberly at what went wrong and fix it in as elegant and minimal a way as possible.

There appear at this time to be two no-brainers. First, we have proven yet again that over-leveraging investments, while immensely profitable in the short term, always leads to disastrous consequences in the end. This simply has to be illegal. Capital requirements need to be enforced not just on regulated banking but on all segments of the financial system that rely on leverage to increase profits. Figuring out the proper ratio of capitalization to leverage is one of the most important things we can do.

Second, we know that the rise of derivatives needs to be looked into. These instruments are enormously useful for hedging risk but there's something more than a little bit rotten when they're used as speculative instruments. We need to tread very carefully here, since even the people who invented the various derivatives don't fully understand their macroeconomic consequences. However, one lesson seems to have been adequately learned: credit default swaps work great as insurance but they have no business being offered as speculative instruments.
Obviously the powers of the treasury secretary have been greatly expanded. The most powerful officer in the cabinet now. Hank Paulson says he won't stay on. Who do you have in mind to appoint to that very important post?
I have no idea yet, but I can tell you that you're not going to like him. He'll be from Wall Street, because the job of running the Treasury requires sophisticated financial expertise and knowledge of the most exotic financial strategies. We will, in effect, be rewarding someone who was at least peripherally involved in precipitating the current crisis. But to do otherwise, to "promote the non-participant," to use a famous aphorism from the engineering world, would be disastrous.
Well, Senators, through this economic crisis, most of the people that I know have had a difficult time. And through this bailout package, I was wondering what it is that's going to actually help those people out.
See above.
Senator Obama, time for a discussion. I'm going to begin with you. Are you saying to Mr. Clark (ph) and to the other members of the American television audience that the American economy is going to get much worse before it gets better and they ought to be prepared for that?
Yes.

The current financial crisis seems far removed from everyday life but the damage it has done to the credit markets has all but ensured at least a mild to moderate recession. We need to accept that, plan for it, and plan for how to speed a recovery. But anybody who tells you that the government can still completely avert a recession is lying to you. The trick is to manage the short and medium term, as I laid out above, to lessen the severity of the recession.
How can we trust either of you with our money when both parties got -- got us into this global economic crisis?
You can't but you still have to be a grownup and recognize that one or the other of us will get elected. Once you accept this fact, there are two things that you need to think about.

First, you need to understand that, just as our economic health is ultimately based on the trust that all parties to a transaction will fulfill their obligations, our national political health is based on some degree of trust that all three branches of government live up to their responsibilities and put the good of the country ahead of their own personal gain or aggrandizement. That trust has been sorely abused in recent years, to the severe detriment of our society. It must be restored and you as a voter are the key to its restoration. You must insist on the integrity of your Congressperson and your Senators. It is your responsibility to diligently investigate his or her record, constantly asking yourself, "Did this person act in the country's best interest?" You have to understand that it's wonderful when your Representative gets your district goodies and indulges your every passing whim or ill-informed opinion, but it is ultimately corrosive to our national security. It is your responsibility to look out for the big picture and to hold your representatives accountable.

Second, understand that controversy and even obstruction are the best friends of good government. Lots of things need to be done in this country but history shows us that government is only the solution in rare instances. Given enough time, the American public and its economy often will improvise a better solution than the one some policy wonk thought up one morning in the shower. The things that weed out the bad ideas in government are time and controversy. We should not fear these, even when they lead to a lot of unpleasantness and noise.
There are new economic realities out there that everyone in this hall and across this country understands that there are going to have to be some choices made. Health policies, energy policies, and entitlement reform, what are going to be your priorities in what order? Which of those will be your highest priority your first year in office and which will follow in sequence?
Energy policy has to be our priority. Energy policy lies at the intersection of our economic well being, our national security, and our environmental health. It is the transcendent challenge of the twenty-first century.

We need to understand that our current entitlement system is ultimately unsustainable. Perhaps the current economic crisis will wake us up a little bit: It's easier to fix things early, before they blow up in your face.

I would love to find ways to reduce the anxiety that ordinary Americans face when they contemplate things that can occur to them or their families because of illness or injury. But we need to understand one thing: There is no free lunch. All health services get paid for. They can be paid for by taxes, by deficit spending, or by the consumer, but that's it. Figuring out the proper mix is essential. Understanding that there is no new money is equally essential.

Finally, let's understand that our national spending habits have now risen to near-crisis levels. Make no mistake: the national debt is a national security issue. Our fate is now partially in the hands of our international creditors. We need to reduce our exposure to those creditors. This will involve severe pain and hard choices, but those choices must be made.
Since World War II, we have never been asked to sacrifice anything to help our country, except the blood of our heroic men and women. As president, what sacrifices -- sacrifices will you ask every American to make to help restore the American dream and to get out of the economic morass that we're now in?
This sounds very noble but it's a bunch of nonsense. Should we ration things when market forces work better than rationing unless we need materiel for a war? Should we restrict individual freedom and force people into community or government service? Should we force people to "volunteer?"

Let's face it: there is only one form of "sacrifice" that government requires of us. It requires that we pay money to support the common weal. That's appropriate. But let's understand that, when you hear somebody talking about how George Bush failed to ask us to sacrifice after 9/11, what they're really saying is that George Bush didn't use 9/11 as a pretext to raise taxes.

You argue whether raising or lowering taxes was an appropriate response to 9/11. But let's make sure that we know that that's the argument we're having.

I do believe that there is a place for leadership. The President can wield huge powers of persuasion and can use those powers to urge the citizenry to be less selfish and act more for the common good. But that case is much better made by education and a little cheerleading. Calls for "sacrifice" are going to fall on deaf ears, as well they should.
Senator Obama, as we begin, very quickly, our discussion period, President Bush, you'll remember, last summer, said that "Wall Street got drunk."

A lot of people now look back and think the federal government got drunk and, in fact, the American consumers got drunk.

How would you, as president, try to break those bad habits of too much debt and too much easy credit, specifically, across the board, for this country, not just at the federal level, but as a model for the rest of the country, as well?
First, the bad habits of too much debt and too much easy credit have pretty much taken care of themselves at the personal and corporate level, haven't they? But this is one of those areas where culture counts. There's a reason why most religions value frugality: it produces a healthier society.

Can government really affect culture through legislation and policy? Maybe a little, but not very much. Can leadership inspire our citizens to reexamine their lives and make changes that benefit not only themselves but society as a whole? Yes. Can one of the two candidates do it? We'll see. Such inspiration requires not only superb communication skills but a certain optimism, a certain confidence in the rightness of one's course of action, and then some serious cheerleading skills.

One thing's for sure: we're unlikely to be able move forward as a nation without at least minor adjustments to the current norms for how we live our economic lives and what we expect from government.
There are lots of issues that we are going to be dealing with here tonight. And we have a question from Langdon (ph) in Ballston Spa, New York, and that's about huge unfunded obligations for Social Security, Medicare, and other entitlement programs that will soon eat up all of the revenue that's in place and then go into a deficit position.

Since the rules are pretty loose here, I'm going to add my own to this one. Instead of having a discussion, let me ask you as a coda to that. Would you give Congress a date certain to reform Social Security and Medicare within two years after you take office? Because in a bipartisan way, everyone agrees, that's a big ticking time bomb that will eat us up maybe even more than the mortgage crisis.
Tom, you were doing so well. Why'd you have to toss in the gotcha question? A date certain is impossible to promise and you know it. It requires the collusion of Congress, which is, at the moment, utterly dysfunctional.

But let's be clear here. Social security and Medicare benefits are going to be reduced over time or they're going to cost much, much more. There is no free lunch. We can either deal with these issues before they reach crisis proportions or we can deal with them when our options have been so reduced that the collapse of the system is all but assured.
Senator McCain, I want to know, we saw that Congress moved pretty fast in the face of an economic crisis. I want to know what you would do within the first two years to make sure that Congress moves fast as far as environmental issues, like climate change and green jobs?
First, please understand that what we did with the financial crisis sucked and we will be dealing with the repercussions of the band-aids we slapped on for years. We want legislation to be deliberative, contentious, and gradual--the complete antithesis of acting in a crisis. This goes as much for environmental legislation as for anything else.

This is not to deny that environmental legislation isn't necessary. But it is impossible to consider climate legislation outside the context of a reasonable energy policy.
Should we fund a Manhattan-like project that develops a nuclear bomb to deal with global energy and alternative energy or should we fund 100,000 garages across America, the kind of industry and innovation that developed Silicon Valley?
Neither.

Manhattan projects work great when the goal is to provide a piece of technology that is utterly independent of the economy, as it was when we built nuclear weapons, and as it was again when we went to the moon. But sustainable energy must be economical or it will simply fail. Betting the farm on a single government project and hoping that it happens to come up with the solution that just happens to be economically viable--to say nothing of optimal--is the height of insanity.

Similarly, government funding of thousands of small projects is intensely inefficient and a criminal waste of the taxpayer's money. Private enterprise knows how to fund thousands of startups and invests money efficiently because the funders are willing to incur the risk for huge financial reward. Getting government to act like venture capitalists is simply impossible. Government doesn't have the same incentives.

What government can do is to tweak the economic climate so that the rewards of sustainable energy projects are enhanced and the costs of unsustainable energy sources are simultaneously increased. Tax credits for hybrid or non-petroleum cars and trucks, home solar energy, and nuclear power plants are good examples of the former. A carbon tax is an example of the latter--a much simpler and more honest example, I might add, than a cap-and-trade system.

Also, please note that none of the above conflicts with permitting new petroleum and gas exploration in offshore, in ANWR, or in oil shale deposits in within our borders. We need a bridge to our new green future. We probably don't need to provide tax breaks for this exploration but we surely need to allow it.
Senator, selling health care coverage in America as the marketable commodity has become a very profitable industry. Do you believe health care should be treated as a commodity?
In this single question we find the biggest problem with the debate over health care. Health care "coverage" is an insurance issue. Health care itself is a service for which we must pay.

A portion of the health care problem is indeed an insurance issue but let's understand what insurance is for. Insurance allows a group of people to share the risk that a very small number of them will get very sick or very badly injured. To share that risk, everybody in the group agrees to pay more than they actually expect to need in return for getting the huge bill paid for if they're unlucky.

"Insurance" for routine care is simply impossible. The best an insurer can do is to provide a central clearinghouse for billing and payments, then pass through the cost for this service and the cost for the actual health care to the consumer. But if the average person buys $500 of health services a year, the insurance bill for those services is guaranteed to be more than $500.

The debate between McCain and Obama revolves around the best way to provide insurance. McCain is arguing that the tax deductions for employer-provided group insurance distort the market and should be done away with. In return, McCain wants to shift those tax breaks to the individual, so that he can buy individual insurance even if he's not fortunate enough to work for an employer with a good group plan. This is fine as far as it goes but it omits the horrible uncertainty associated with individual plans. Until that uncertainty is removed, McCain's plan will merely ensure that even fewer employers offer good group plans, causing more nervousness for more Americans.

Obama is arguing that we can keep existing employers' group plans as-is, force all other employers to adopt similar group plans, and finally backstop the whole thing with a Medicare-style group plan that's run by the government. Obama is right that we must offer the security of group insurance to all Americans but he's doing it in a way that all but guarantees the destruction of the private insurance market. Employers will drop their private plans in favor of the vanilla-flavored government plan, thereby reducing the pool of available subscribers to the point where the private guys will exit the business. We'll be left with a single-payer health care system after a while.

Neither candidate does anything to distinguish the difference between insurance to catastrophes and routine health care costs in general. That distinction is crucial, because it allows a portion of the health care market--the portion responsible for relatively routine care--to be subjected to market forces.

McCain has made more noise about local clinics and low-cost care and he deserves credit for that. But this is ultimately futile unless those clinics are able to do fee for service or at the very least participate in HMO schemes that aren't burdened with mandatory coverage for catastrophic procedures.

Obama has understood that the fundamental insecurity of individual insurance is intolerable and he deserves credit for that. But mandating group insurance for all is prohibitively expensive unless that group insurance is limited to catastrophic insurance. Furthermore, the built-in bias that ultimately leads to a single-payer system is just awful for future health care innovation. Few companies want to develop a product or service and sell it into a monopsony, and those that do have very little interest in efficiency. Check out your local defense contractor if you think otherwise.

The proper solution is to mandate catastrophic, private group coverage for all. That will increase the average catastrophic premium by quite a bit, but it will dramatically reduce the premium one would pay for combined routine+catastrophic coverage. Those premiums will need to be subsidized for lower-income citizens. McCain's tax credit, subject to suitable phase-outs, would work fine for that.

We can then let the market experiment with all kinds of schemes to handle routine care: doc-in-the-box, WalMart-style clinics, slimmed-down HMOs, you name it. As with the insurance portion, this routine care will need to be subsidized through tax policy or some other mechanism.
Quick discussion. Is health care in America a privilege, a right, or a responsibility?
This is a stupid question. Health care is something you have to pay for. All we're arguing about is whether to pay for it as a nation (through taxes or deficit spending), as a set of groups (through insurance policies and employer benefits), or as individuals.

However, one hard truth needs to be spoken here. The nature of medical technology has now advanced to the point where arbitrary life extension can be had for an exponentially increasing cost. On one level, this is wonderful news, because those that can afford to pay for such treatment subsidize an industry that will make cheap life-extension possible as treatments are perfected. But on a much more fundamental level, this fact will force us to change one of our most dearly held beliefs: that life is sacred and must be extended at any cost. That was fine when "any cost" simply didn't mean very much because medical technology couldn't do much. Continuing to provide the most exotic life-extension treatments to the ordinary citizen through a program like Medicare is simply not feasible. We must confront this truth soon and begin to grapple with it as a society.
Senator McCain, how will all the recent economic stress affect our nation's ability to act as a peacemaker in the world?
We pay for wars with deficit spending. If we have existential wars, we lose when the world decides that we are no longer able to pay those debts. That's one of the many reasons why the national debt is a national security problem.

We also engage in wars or military actions to further our national interest. Those operations must sometimes be curtailed when the money isn't available for them. Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are existential wars. In some respect, they are "optional." However, no war is optional once we have engaged in it. These last few weeks have once again reinforced how much our world operates on trust. Foreign powers, both our friends and enemies, must trust that the US will accomplish what it sets out to accomplish, however difficult the undertaking. That is why we must leave both Iraq and Afghanistan only when those countries are stable and able to defend their sovereignty. In many respects, even though those wars may have begun as "optional," they are now an existential matter, in that failure in either of them so damages US credibility that they could invite a truly existential threat.
Senator Obama, let me ask you if -- let's see if we can establish tonight the Obama doctrine and the McCain doctrine for the use of United States combat forces in situations where there's a humanitarian crisis, but it does not affect our national security.

Take the Congo, where 4.5 million people have died since 1998, or take Rwanda in the earlier dreadful days, or Somalia.

What is the Obama doctrine for use of force that the United States would send when we don't have national security issues at stake?
Here's the Radically Moderate doctrine for the use of US military force:
  1. The US will use military force to further the national interest. In some cases, furtherance of national interest includes humanitarian missions, especially when those missions build goodwill and/or trust in a troubled region.

  2. The US will only undertake military missions where success is possible and, once undertaken, the US will take any and all steps to ensure success.
Seems pretty simple to me.
Should the United States respect Pakistani sovereignty and not pursue al Qaeda terrorists who maintain bases there, or should we ignore their borders and pursue our enemies like we did in Cambodia during the Vietnam War?
Like Iraq, we are fighting a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. The key to winning a counter-insurgency doesn't lie first in denying the enemy safe havens. They key to winning lies in expelling the enemy from the territory over which he wishes to gain control. As long as we concentrate on al Qaeda bases in Pakistan and ignore the crucial task of making Afghans willing to fight to expel these invaders, we'll never make any progress.

This isn't to say that attacking enemy bases in Pakistan might not be necessary. It's simply not the key strategy to victory. As long as we keep getting wrapped around the axle over Pakistani sovereignty and violations thereof, we're not focusing on the proper priorities.

A better question, however, is what we do if the contagion spreads in Pakistan and it becomes a failed state. A nuclear nation in chaos is simply unacceptable. We need to extend as much help as we can provide to Pakistan, be it military, economic, or political, to ensure that a stable democracy thrives there. That democracy is every bit as important as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, even if the "Pottery Barn rule" doesn't quite apply.

At the same time, we must communicate to Pakistan in no uncertain terms that with membership in the nuclear club come the gravest of responsibilities. Instability simply cannot be tolerated and, while we fully support their efforts to maintain a stable, sovereign democracy, we can't have infinite patience if their nation deteriorates below some critical threshold.
Can I get a quick response from the two of you about developments in Afghanistan this week? The senior British military commander, who is now leading there for a second tour, and their senior diplomatic presence there, Sherard Cowper-Coles, who is well known as an expert in the area, both have said that we're failing in Afghanistan.

The commander said we cannot win there. We've got to get it down to a low level insurgency, let the Afghans take it over. Cowper-Coles said what we need is an acceptable dictator.

If either of you becomes president, as one of you will, how do you reorganize Afghanistan's strategy or do you? Briefly, if you can.
We have had our our focus on Iraq for quite a while now. Whether you believe the war in Iraq was justified or not (and I think it might have waited for a little bit longer in retrospect, although I supported the invasion at the time), Iraq became strategically more important the moment we invaded it. Unfortunately, this required that we de-prioritize Afghanistan, just as we had a "Europe first" strategy in World War II that let the war in the Pacific languish until Germany was on the ropes.

The good news is that we have developed counter-insurgency tactics that actually work in Iraq. I am optimistic that those tactics will port over to Afghanistan with minimal modifications. As the need for military force in Iraq decreases, a robust counter-insurgency can be mounted in Afghanistan. That is a change of emphasis but not necessarily of strategy.

Senator Obama makes much of the fact that we haven't killed or captured Osama bin Laden. Our failure to do so at Tora Bora was inexcusable and a major failure of the Bush Administration. However, the Senator is indulging in the most scurrilous demagoguery when he suggests that increased troop presence in Afghanistan would have allowed us to chase down bin Laden. Bin Laden is not an idiot. He's hiding out in Pakistan because he knows that we can hunt him there only indirectly. All the troops in the world wouldn't make a difference to that. Surely the Senator isn't suggesting that we invade Pakistan simply to further our hunt for bin Laden?
How can we apply pressure to Russia for humanitarian issues in an effective manner without starting another Cold War?
On internal Russian humanitarian issues we can't do very much, nor should we. We can keep some low-level diplomatic pressure on Russia with regard to human rights, similar to the way that we put diplomatic pressure on China for the same reason.

Russia is a threat to its neighbors, especially the former SSRs. In reality we're already engaged in a Cold War with Russia over those states' sovereignty. Russia's Georgian adventure is unlikely to be its last in its former republics. A Cold War is entirely appropriate in this case.

We have three major approaches to de-fang Russia when it comes to its neighbors. First, we can extend the NATO umbrella to more former republics, especially to the Ukraine and Georgia. Second, we can do everything we can to change the oil and gas logistics in Europe. To the extent that the European economy becomes less dependent on hydrocarbons flowing specifically from Russia, the less leverage Russia has over Europe. Finally, an overall reduction in demand for hydrocarbons through the use of sustainable energy sources will choke off a major source of wealth to Russia. The Russians aren't stupid; if they can't make petrodollars, they will put their incredibly well-trained labor force to work doing something more productive. That's to everybody's benefit--especially the Russians.
This requires only a yes or a no. Ronald Reagan famously said that the Soviet Union was the evil empire. Do you think that Russia under Vladimir Putin is an evil empire?
No.

Putin is taking Russia in a direction that may be good only for Russia, but they are far from a world-threatening power. Russia has interests that sometimes conflict with ours. We need to thwart those conflicting interests while fostering those that coincide with ours. Diplomacy is all about being a grownup. Demonization is inappropriate, especially for Russia.
Senator, as a retired Navy chief, my thoughts are often with those who serve our country. I know both candidates, both of you, expressed support for Israel.

If, despite your best diplomatic efforts, Iran attacks Israel, would you be willing to commit U.S. troops in support and defense of Israel? Or would you wait on approval from the U.N. Security Council?
Iran has only two ways to attack Israel. First, it can attack through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. These groups, while vicious and immensely problematic, do not pose an existential threat to Israel. Under no circumstances should the US be militarily involved in combating them, nor should we retaliate directly against Iran for proxy attacks against Israel.

The only way that Iran can existentially threaten Israel is with nuclear weapons. The development of nuclear weapons by Iran must be resisted vigorously. That resistance should be diplomatic, economic, and, as a last resort, military.

But we have a weak hand here. We can and should try more robust diplomacy with Iran. However, let's understand that diplomacy through our European allies has already been pretty robust and has yielded nothing. Iran may simply have judged that the acquisition of nukes trumps any temporary blows to its political and economic standing with the West. After all, we're still buying oil and gas from them and they may figure that that's plenty to keep them afloat until they can consolidate their power.

Our military options are poor. We can raid their nuclear facilities but the sad fact is that even a robust international coalition would have a hard time invading Iran deeply enough to guarantee a permanent end to their nuclear program. They have us over a barrel and they know it.

But we have one other option, which we simply haven't tried. Since a nuclear Iran is possible, we will need to develop a doctrine for how we deter Iran, just as we had a nuclear deterrence doctrine to deal with the Soviet Union. And that doctrine may actually be useful in convincing Iran to give up on its nuclear ambitions. I would advocate that we adopt the following policy immediately, even before Iran has acquired nuclear weapons:

"Absent incontrovertible proof to the contrary, it shall be the policy of the United States to regard any nuclear attack in the Middle East as an attack, by Iran, against the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response."

Students of the Cuban Missile Crisis will recognize this adaptation of President Kennedy's language, which ensured that the Soviet Union understood the stakes of their little adventure. I see know reason why similar language can't make it clear to Iran that there is very little upside to their membership in the nuclear club, and a catastrophic downside. Iran must learn that nuclear power comes with great responsibility. If they then choose to embark upon this perilous course, let no one say that they didn't understand that their national existence hinged upon their restraint.
And you'll both be interested to know this comes from the Internet and it's from a state that you're strongly contesting, both of you. It's from Peggy (ph) in Amherst, New Hampshire. And it has a certain Zen-like quality, I'll give you a fair warning.

She says, "What don't you know and how will you learn it?"
In the last eight years, the United States has suffered three huge disasters: the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and now the financial crisis. All three of these crises revealed systemic deficiencies in our response, as well as deep failures of imagination in the period before each of them.

The thing that we should learn from all three of these events is that even our huge, immensely powerful, immensely wealthy government has real, finite limitations, not only on its power but on its competence and ability. This is not a condemnation of our government nor is it an expression of futility. It is simply an acknowledgment of fact. Governments don't do well with new situations.

In a world of increasing complexity, it is entirely possible that crises like these are going to be increasingly frequent. We don't know what shape the next one will take. But we have learned from the past and our capabilities have improved as a result.

The next President will steer into increasingly perilous waters. He needs to be smart. He needs to be agile. He needs to be humble and able to find and adapt the best advice he can get. But most of all, he needs to be courageous. Whatever the challenge, we will depend upon him and his government to do the things that individuals or smaller groups can't do for themselves. We will count on him for leadership in the rough weather ahead.

Saturday, April 12, 2008

A Mortgage Data Bleg

In a previous post, I argued that there's a large population of homeowners for whom a mortgage bailout will do nothing. Seems to me that we need some data here. To what percentage of mortgagees do the following statements apply:
  • I have virtually no sunk costs in my house.


  • I have sunk costs, but they're all underwater due to price declines and unlikely to be abovewater any time soon.


  • I am no more emotionally attached to the house that I own than I would be to a comparable rental property.


  • It is so unlikely that I'll buy another home in the next 5-10 years that I'm willing to take the hit to my credit to default and mail in my keys.
If any of these statements apply to a significant percentage of the people that a bailout would target, the bailout is going to fail.

Thursday, April 3, 2008

What Gets Bailed Out in a Mortgage Bailout?

Congress is jumping all over itself (I do not recommend visualizing this metaphor) to get the most extravagant form of borrower mortgage bailout passed. Presumably, this will let the folks with the most egregious sub-prime loans convert them to something with less rate escalation.

But weren't the sub-prime loans originated with little or no equity? If so, then they're almost certainly underwater with little or no sunk costs. So reducing the interest rate has only marginal utility. The "owners" can bug out whenever they want by mailing in the keys and taking the credit hit. They suffer no direct financial consequences by walking away, lower rates or not.

The picture gets a little better with owners who had equity in their homes initially, even though the decline in prices has wiped it out. At least these folks have some sunk costs, which, however irrational it might be, will tend to make them want to stay in the house and hope that prices go back up. Seems like any bailout should be targeted at this population of homeowners.

In an earlier post, I'd recommended relieving defaulters of the adverse credit reporting consequences of walking away. Based on the above, this would be an incredibly bad idea. At this point, we're really looking for ways to incent people to stay in underwater loans and tough it out.

Wednesday, March 12, 2008

Some Thoughts On the Fed's Latest Move

From Megan McArdle:
A lot of lay people watch banks taking huge writedowns on mortgage backed securities, and the mess in the housing market, and worry that there are even deeper writedowns to come. That isn't the frightening part. The frightening part is that the writedowns are already too deep. The markets in many of these securities have basically seized up, and financial firms are required to use something called "mark to market" accounting for their securities--which is to say that rather than carrying these assets on their books at the historical cost they paid for them, which is the common procedure for assets like factories and delivery trucks, the banks have to update their financial statements to reflect the market price of securities. The problem is, there is no market price. Unable to value their holdings, or other holdings (securities or firm shares) that are dependent on revenue from the illiquid securities, many financial institutions are basically throwing up their hands and saying "I don't know, call it zero."

Friday, February 1, 2008

More Housing Bubble Stuff

Here's an interesting article from yesterday's Financial Times on What Went Wrong:
In particular, it seems that mathematical models used to predict future default rates, based on past patterns of losses, have gone wrong because they did not adjust to reflect shifts in household behaviour. Or, to put it another way, financiers have been tripped up because they ignored one of the most basic rules of investment, which is usually found in product literature: the past is not always a guide to the future.

“There has been a failure in some of the key assumptions which supported our analysis and modelling,” Mr McDaniel admits. “The information quality deteriorated in a way that was not appreciated by Moody’s or others.” Mortgage borrowers, in other words, did not behave as expected.

The issue at stake revolves around so-called delinquency rates, the proportion of people who fall behind on their debt repayments. When American households have faced hard times in previous decades, they tended to default on unsecured loans such as credit cards and car loans first – and stopped paying their mortgage only as a last resort. However, in the last couple of years households have become delinquent on their mortgages much faster than trends in the wider economy might suggest. That is particularly true of the less creditworthy subprime borrowers. More­over, consumers have stopped paying mortgages before they halt payments on their credit cards or automotive loans – turning the traditional delinquency pattern on its head. As a result, mortgage lenders have started to face losses at a much earlier stage than in the past.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

You Too Can Think Like a Hedge Fund Manager

An interesting tidbit from N+1, where they interview a hedge fund manager. I'm afraid I won't be catching any financial paradigm shifts. Damn.

Monday, December 17, 2007

Subprime Problems

George Will asks some good questions on the various subprime bailout schemes:
Perhaps Washington's intervention in the subprime problem reveals the tiny tip of an enormous new entitlement: People who voluntarily run a risk, betting that they will escape unscathed, are entitled to government-organized amelioration when they lose their bets. The costs of this entitlement will include new ambiguities in the concepts of contracts and private property.

But Will's argument has a couple of soft spots:
Regarding "predatory lending," remember that Congress often operates on the principle "first criminalize, then define." But did "predatory" lenders expect the borrowers upon whom they supposedly preyed to default?

Given that lenders just discount the loans and re-sell them, I think the answer to this question is actually "yes." But the risk to the economy doesn't lie at the low end with the borrowers. The problem is that, somewhere in the byzantine packaging and leveraging of these loans, the risk associated with them got quantified wrong. The credit crunch results from lending institutions that would normally invest in relatively safe mortgage-backed securities suddenly discovering that they've got huge portfolios of what are effectively junk bonds.

I thought Greenspan's comments on This Week were well taken:
STEPHANOPOULOS: The political world is now looking at the immediate gain. And Senator Clinton looks — has called for a freeze on foreclosures. Senator Edwards called for a rescue fund to be set up by the government for people who are facing these kind of foreclosures. What do you think about those ideas?

GREENSPAN: It’s important to help those people … without affecting the mortgage rates and without affecting the structure of markets. Cash [from the government] is available and we should use that in larger amounts. … It’s far less damaging to the economy to create a short term fiscal problem, which we would, than to try to fix the prices of homes or interest rates. If you do that, it’ll drag this process out indefinitely.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But by infusing cash, it sounds like you agree, then, with former Treasury secretary Larry Summers, who says that, right now, given this crisis, there has to be a bias toward activism.

GREENSPAN: It depends what you mean by activism. If you mean doing something that works, absolutely. If you mean doing something just for the sake of perceptions, that’s very costly. I don’t know if [infusing cash] would work, but it would certainly help people — it would help their incomes; it would help their personal state, without affecting the structure of the way markets are behaving and the way adjustment process is going on. It’s very critical that this thing reach a selling climax — if I may put it in other words, exhaust itself. It’s only when the markets are perceived to have exhausted themselves on the downside that they turn. Trying to prevent them from going down just merely prolongs the agony.


Update: But of course we must always be sensitive to the true human tragedy of subprime lending.

Wednesday, October 31, 2007

Why I Won't Be Buying any Airline Stocks

This Weekly Standard article asserts that the key to improving the overall airline passenger experience is to provide the appropriate competitive kick to airport authorities (and their underwriting airlines) so that they're forced to improve their security and capacity problems. The recent deregulation of destination airports and landing slots between the US and Europe is cited as an example. But on the passenger comfort side:
Of course, none of this will matter if America's airlines do what they are signaling they intend to do: keep capacity low enough to enable them to raise fares, lower service standards, allow their fleets to age rather than order new aircraft, and use the sardine can as a model for the seating configurations of the few new planes they do order. Gordon Bethune, former CEO of Continental Airlines, once commented on reductions in the quality of service that "You can take so much cheese off the pizza that nobody will eat it." Perhaps. But for now the skimpy pizza is the only food on offer.

Having just gotten off a Boston-to-DFW-to-Austin flight about 15 hours ago, my simmering business-traveller resentment is fresh. I would do almost anything to avoid business travel.

I suspect that the airlines know this, but they think that the biz set is a captive customer base. As long as they have to travel, they'll shop for the best deals and the best service, but there's no category-killer out there waiting to scoop up all the business.

Wrong.

I work in telecom. I've seen the telepresence systems that are coming onto the market. You can conduct a large amount of business every bit as effectively over them as you can face-to-face. These aren't your cheesy room videoconferencing systems. They're like being there. As long as you don't have to socialize with your customers to conduct business with them, they're vastly more cost-effective than travel. Obviously, landing an account requires that face-to-face socializing and trust-building. But servicing existing accounts doesn't.

Back in the 70's, the US automakers asked all kinds of questions about driving experience and comfort. As a result, they built large, comfortable cars with low quality and lousy gas mileage, secure in the knowledge that they were optimally balancing market needs and profits. But they lacked the imagination to ask questions about fuel economy and quality. As a result, Japanese automakers swooped in and disrupted their markets.

The airlines are in a similar spot today. All their market research is oriented around questions like, "Since you have to travel, what will constitute acceptable service?" But the question they should be asking is: "What will make you stop travelling?"

The answer to that question is likely to result in a 50% reduction in business travel over the next ten years. The airlines don't see it coming.

Tuesday, October 16, 2007

Quant Suff!

A fascinating article in Technology Review on financial engineering and the subprime mortgage meltdown. Part 1 here and part 2 here. The models are slowly evolving beyond the ability of the engineers to undestand them.